In 2014, Yeh et al. proposed a robust smart card secured authentication scheme on SIP using elliptic curve cryptography to conquer many forms of attacks in previous protocols. Yeh et al. claimed that their proposed protocol is more efficient than Diffie-Hellman's concept authentication protocols for SIP and performs secured mutual authentication, which can be implemented on different real network environments such as VoIP. However, this paper points out that Yeh et al.'s protocol not only suffers from stolen smart card attack, but also does not provide perfect forward secrecy.
Introduction
Session Initiation Protocol(SIP) has been widely used in current Internet protocols such as Hyper Text Transport Protocol(HTTP) and Simple Mail Transport Protocol(SMTP) [1] . SIP is a powerful signaling protocol that controls communications on the Internet for establishing, maintaining and terminating sessions. However, the original authentication scheme for SIP does not provide strong security because it works based on HTTP Digest authentication noted in RFC2617 [2] . The services that are enabled by SIP are equally applicable to mobile and ubiquitous computing. For example, a user can register its locations with a SIP server and then it will know the availability and location of the user. In addition, the location could be home, work-place or in mobile [1, 2] .
Since Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC) provides a smaller key size than any other cryptosystem and has faster computations than half of the other public key systems at the same security levels [3] , ECC is suitable to be used for higher security authentication. Recently, various ECC-based SIP authentication protocols have been proposed to strengthen the security [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] .
In 2014, Yeh et al. [9] also proposed a robust smart card secured authentication scheme on SIP using ECC to conquer many forms of attacks in previous protocols. Yeh et al. claimed that their proposed protocol is more efficient than Diffie-Hellman's concept authentication protocols for SIP and performs secured mutual authentication, which can be implemented on different real network environments such as VoIP [9] . However, this paper points out that Yeh et al.'s protocol not only suffers from stolen smart card attack, but also does not provide perfect forward secrecy [7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13] . This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the Yeh et al.'s ECC-based authentication protocol for SIP. The security flaws of Yeh et al.'s protocol are shown in Section 3. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 4.
Review of ECC-based Authentication Protocol for SIP
This section briefly reviews Yeh et al.'s protocol [9] . The Yeh et al.'s protocol consists of four phases: initiation phase, registration phase, mutual authentication phase, and password change phase. We outlined some notations used in this research paper.
• qs : private key of system
• K IDA : secret key of the user
• k : shared session key between client and server
• N r : random number
• T : timestamp
• G P : cyclic group of prime order n of P
• P : large prime generator of group
• n : order of elliptic curve
• h(·) : secure one-way hash function: {0, 1} * → {0, 1}
• H 1 (·) : secure one-way hash function H 1 : {0, 1} * → G P
• H 2 (·) : secure one-way hash function H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z * P
• H 3 (·) : secure one-way hash function H 3 : {0, 1} * → Z * P
• × : scalar multiplication of elliptic curve
• ⊕ : exclusive operation
• || : string concatenation operation
Initiation phase
In this pahse, the user and the server set up several system parameters and formula for session key generation as follows:
I1. Both user and server choose an elliptic curve order n over E p (a, b) generated by P , where n is a large number for the security considerations.
I2. The server randomly selects qs ∈ Z * P as the private key.
I3. The system parameters {N
} are prestored in the smart card of user, where N r is a large random number.
Registration phase
In this phase, the user wants to register to the remote server and setup the secret codes into the smart card for the user. The following steps are executed:
R1. client → server: {username, pw y }
The user enters his/her username id and password pw x to compute the pw y = h(pw x ⊕ N r ), and then submits id and pw y to remote server.
R2. The server computes
R3. The server computes B A = h(id ⊕ pw y ) and W A = h(pw y ||id) ⊕ K IDA .
R4. The server stores the secret parameters {B
} to a smart card and then issues the smart card to the user over a secure channel.
R5. The user stores N r in the smart card. As a result, the user stores secret parameters
Mutual authentication phase
Assume that user wants to communicate with the remote SIP server; he/she must enter username and password.
M1. client → server: REQUEST{username, T 1 , M A , R * A } The user enters pw x and then computes pw y = h(pw x ⊕ N r ) and B A = h(id ⊕ pw y ). Next, the user confirms whether the B A is equal to B A . If they are equal, the user computes V = h(pw y ||id) and K IDA = W A ⊕ V . In addition, the user chooses a random point
Finally, the user sends the REQUEST message to the remote server.
When the server receives REQUEST message, the server computes = M k . If it holds, the server is authenticated by user; otherwise, terminate the process. Finally, the user computes response = h(username||realm||k) and then sends the RESPONSE message to the server.
M4. server → client: INVITE
When the server receives RESPONSE message from the user, the server computes response * = h(username||realm||k) and then verifies whether
= response. If the equality holds, the server sends the INVITE message and accepts the connection.
After finishing the mutual authentication, both the user and the server compute the common session key k = H 3 (U x ||R x A ||R x S ) for their subsequent communication.
Password change phase
P1. The user can request to change his/her password with the new password pw *
x after entering a username and a pw x . Next, the user computes a new value of pw * y = h(pw * x ⊕ N r ) to update pw y into the smart card.
P2. After receiving the demand for password change, the server computes
The new value is stored to the smart card by the server.
Cryptanalysis of Yeh et al.'s Protocol
This section demonstrates that Yeh et al.'s protocol not only suffers from stolen smart card attack, but also does not provide perfect forward secrecy.
Stolen smart card attack
Stolen smart card attack means that an attacker who possessed with smart card performs any operation which the smart card and obtains any secret information [13] . Suppose that an attacker Eve obtained a legal user's smart card. We know that the smart card has the data {B A , W A , N r , h(·), H 1 (·), H 2 (·), H 3 (·)} for the user. Then, the attacker Eve can perform the following stolen smart card attack.
A1. Eve selects a candidate password pw * x .
A2. Eve computes pw
* y = h(pw * x ⊕ N r ).
A3. Eve checks if the following equation holds or not
If the check passes, then Eve confirms that the guessed password pw * x is the correct one.
A4. If it is not correct, Eve chooses another password pw * * x and repeatedly performs above step (3) until
A5. If Eve correctly obtains the user password pw * x , Eve can extract the secret key K IDA by computing W A ⊕ h(pw * y ||id), where pw *
can easily obtain the secret key K IDA .
By using pw * x and K IDA , the attacker Eve can freely perform the user impersonation attack or the server impersonation attack. Therefore, Yeh et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the above stolen smart card attack.
Perfect forward secrecy problem
Perfect forward secrecy is one of the security notions addressing the session key exposure issues [7, 8] . Perfect forward secrecy means that if a long-term private key(e.g. user password pw x or system's private key qs) is compromised, this does not compromise any earlier session keys. Suppose that the system's private key qs and the user authentication key K IDA are compromised, then the attacker Eve can perform the following attack to obtain the common session
A1. From the intercepted client's REQUEST message{username, T 1 , M A , R * A }, the attacker Eve can obtain U IDA = (U x , U y ) by computing H 1 (id) from username, where
A2. By using the compromised system's private key qs and the obtained U IDA , Eve can obtain R A = (R 
where t 1 = H 2 (T 1 ) and M A is included in the client's REQUEST message.
A3. From the intercepted server's CHALLENGE{realm,, T 2 , M S , M k }, Eve can obtain R S = (R x S , R y S ) by computing
where K IDA is the compromised user authentication key, t 2 = H 2 (T 2 ), and M S is included in the server's CHALLENGE message.
A4. By knowing the U IDA = (U x , U y ), R A = (R 
Therefore, Yeh et al.'s protocol cannot provide the perfect forward secrecy.
Conclusions
This paper pointed out that recently proposed Yeh et al.'s robust smart card secured authentication scheme on SIP using elliptic curve cryptography not only suffers from stolen smart card attack, but also does not provide perfect forward secrecy. Further works will be focused on improving the Yeh et al.'s protocol which can be able to provide strong security.
